Obama’s nuclear security summit has pursuaded some 47 countries to sign onto an informal pact to keep nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists within four years. One focus of the summit is Iran, but the background is the recent signing of an arms reduction treaty between the US and Russia.
Meanwhile, some clarification of the much-abused term “rogue,” often applied to countries that joined the nuclear club later than the US or Russia, like India, Pakistan, and Israel.
1. The numbers below, from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, speak for themselves, even though they too understate the case. The US and Russia are astronomically more “nuclear” than any other states. So long as they are, every other state not only has the right but the duty to arm themselves with nuclear weapons or suffer Iraq’s fate.
2. India and Pakistan were NON-signatories to the NPT. They were responding to this massive power asymmetry. Non-signatories to a treaty cannot be “rogue” states flouting the treaty, as the propaganda goes.
Iran is a signatory, but ought never to have signed in the circumstances. (Nor, as long as this imbalance stays, should any prudent state).
3. Israel, which as has never admitted to its program, is a signatory to the NPT, so if any state is to be labeled “rogue” (a term I consider inflammatory) it’s Israel, as much as Iran, whatever the alleged level of Iran’s incipient nuclearization.
From what we’ve learned from whistle-blowers like Mordechai Vanunu, Israel continues to operate what is widely regarded as a far bigger program than what’s listed below. It’s probably now the world’s 3rd or 4th largest nuclear power.
Note: I support Israel’s right to have nuclear weapons, as well as Iran’s, as well as any other country’s. Disarmament for all, or disarmament for none.
Talking about Iran’s feeble efforts at nuclear self-defense without mentioning the weapons held by Israel, Europe, and Russia, all around Iran, is dangerous and reads like hypocrisy to the rest of the world.
| Country | Warheads active/total* | Year of first test | CTBT status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Five nuclear weapons states from the NPT | |||
| United States | 2,626 / 9,400[3] | 1945 (“Trinity“) | Signatory |
| Russia (former Soviet Union) | 4,650 / 12,000[3] | 1949 (“RDS-1“) | Ratifier |
| United Kingdom | <160 / 185[3] | 1952 (“Hurricane“) | Ratifier |
| France | ~300 / 300[3] | 1960 (“Gerboise Bleue“) | Ratifier |
| China | ~180 / 240[3] | 1964 (“596“) | Signatory |
| Non-NPT nuclear powers | |||
| India | n.a. / 60-80[3] | 1974 (“Smiling Buddha“) | Non-signatory |
| Pakistan | n.a. / 70-90[3] | 1998 (“Chagai-I“) | Non-signatory |
| North Korea | n.a. / <10[3] | 2006 (2006 test) | Non-signatory |
| Undeclared nuclear powers | |||
| Israel | n.a. / 80[3] | possibly 1979 (See Vela Incident) | Signatory |
All numbers are estimates from the Natural Resources Defense Council, published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, unless other references are given. The latest update was on April 6, 2010. If differences between active and total stockpile are known, they are given as two figures separated by a forward slash. If specifics are not available (n.a.), only one figure is given. Stockpile number may not contain all intact warheads if a substantial amount of warheads are scheduled for but have not yet gone through dismantlement; not all “active” warheads are deployed at any given time. When a range of weapons is given (e.g., 0–10), it generally indicates that the estimate is being made on the amount of fissile material that has likely been produced, and the amount of fissile material needed per warhead depends on estimates of a country’s proficiency at nuclear weapon design.