Andrew Korybko, an American political analyst in Moscow and author of several books on US color revolutions, or hybrid wars, analyzes the delicate balance between the super-powers driving both India and Russia:
An American Official Accidentally Got It Right About Russia and India:
Exactly as Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh said, the potentially disproportionate dependence that Russia might eventually come to have on China could have real implications for India and obviously be unfavorable. It’s with these credible strategic concerns in mind that India is seeking to preemptively thwart that scenario from ever materializing by functioning as an alternative Western pressure valve for Russia so that it doesn’t have to disproportionately depend on China to that end.
The US’ understanding of Russian-Indian relations is outdated as evidenced by US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland’s
inaccurate assessment of their ties just the other day. This is partly because such figures remain ignorant of the
emotional element in their relationship, but one American official just accidentally got it right. Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA) for International Economics Daleep Singh was just in New Delhi where he responded to a question from the
Hindustan Times regarding US President Joe Biden’s scandalous claim that India’s position in the Quad is “somewhat shaky” with respect to Russia’s
ongoing special military operation in Ukraine.
The relevant part of his answer is as follows:
“China is a strategic threat to a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific. If you set that against the reality that China and Russia have now declared a no limits partnership, and that Russia has said that China is its most important strategic partner, by extension, that has real implications for India. No one should kid themselves – Russia is going to be the junior partner in this relationship with China. And the more leverage that China gains over Russia, the less favourable that is for India. I don’t think anyone would believe that if China once again breached the Line of [Actual] Control, that Russia would come running to India’s defence.”
The rest of the analysis will explain what he got right and why, as well as the part that he still got wrong.
Singh wasn’t correct in his threat assessment of China but that was to be expected since he represents the greatest geopolitical opponent of the People’s Republic after all. Be that as it may, it’s his right to describe whoever he wants however he wants, but his claim about Russia not coming to India’s defense was factually false. Reports from the time of those two Asian Great Powers’ clash along the Galwan River Valley in summer 2020
suggested that Russia made early deliveries of ammunition and weapons to India worth $1 billion during that time. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh (no relation) also
traveled to Moscow shortly after to attend Russia’s Victory Day parade and negotiate even more military deals.
It’s what Deputy NSA Singh got right, however, that’s worthwhile focusing on. Like the author explained in the first hyperlinked analysis in the present piece connected to Nuland’s inaccurate assessment of Russian-Indian relations, New Delhi is indeed driven by the fear that Moscow could become Beijing’s junior partner to remain steadfastly loyal to its half-century-long special and privileged strategic partner through its policy of
principled neutrality towards the Ukrainian Conflict. Exactly as Singh said, the potentially disproportionate dependence that Russia might eventually come to have on China could have real implications for India and obviously be unfavorable.