Indo-Russian Ties Complicate Indian Balancing Act Between America, China

Andrew Korybko, an American political analyst in Moscow and author of several books on US color revolutions, or hybrid wars, analyzes the delicate balance between the super-powers driving both India and Russia:

An American Official Accidentally Got It Right About Russia and India:

Exactly as Deputy National Security Advisor for International Economics Daleep Singh said, the potentially disproportionate dependence that Russia might eventually come to have on China could have real implications for India and obviously be unfavorable. It’s with these credible strategic concerns in mind that India is seeking to preemptively thwart that scenario from ever materializing by functioning as an alternative Western pressure valve for Russia so that it doesn’t have to disproportionately depend on China to that end.

The US’ understanding of Russian-Indian relations is outdated as evidenced by US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland’s inaccurate assessment of their ties just the other day. This is partly because such figures remain ignorant of the emotional element in their relationship, but one American official just accidentally got it right. Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA) for International Economics Daleep Singh was just in New Delhi where he responded to a question from the Hindustan Times regarding US President Joe Biden’s scandalous claim that India’s position in the Quad is “somewhat shaky” with respect to Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine.
The relevant part of his answer is as follows:
“China is a strategic threat to a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific. If you set that against the reality that China and Russia have now declared a no limits partnership, and that Russia has said that China is its most important strategic partner, by extension, that has real implications for India. No one should kid themselves – Russia is going to be the junior partner in this relationship with China. And the more leverage that China gains over Russia, the less favourable that is for India. I don’t think anyone would believe that if China once again breached the Line of [Actual] Control, that Russia would come running to India’s defence.”
The rest of the analysis will explain what he got right and why, as well as the part that he still got wrong.
Singh wasn’t correct in his threat assessment of China but that was to be expected since he represents the greatest geopolitical opponent of the People’s Republic after all. Be that as it may, it’s his right to describe whoever he wants however he wants, but his claim about Russia not coming to India’s defense was factually false. Reports from the time of those two Asian Great Powers’ clash along the Galwan River Valley in summer 2020 suggested that Russia made early deliveries of ammunition and weapons to India worth $1 billion during that time. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh (no relation) also traveled to Moscow shortly after to attend Russia’s Victory Day parade and negotiate even more military deals.
It’s what Deputy NSA Singh got right, however, that’s worthwhile focusing on. Like the author explained in the first hyperlinked analysis in the present piece connected to Nuland’s inaccurate assessment of Russian-Indian relations, New Delhi is indeed driven by the fear that Moscow could become Beijing’s junior partner to remain steadfastly loyal to its half-century-long special and privileged strategic partner through its policy of principled neutrality towards the Ukrainian Conflict. Exactly as Singh said, the potentially disproportionate dependence that Russia might eventually come to have on China could have real implications for India and obviously be unfavorable.

Ukraine: In Russia’s Sphere Of Influence, Not America’s

At Forbes, Doug Bandow at Cato has written an excellent piece on the turmoil in Ukraine, over which the imperial bullies in DC (and their covert adjutants are salivating:

“Washington should endorse justice and human dignity, which justifies support for honest elections and warnings against police brutality.  Of course, America’s message would have greater credibility if Washington better respected such values both at home and in its dealings with other nations which don’t always share America’s “interests and values.”

But Ukraine’s “economic health,” “European future,” “turn toward Moscow,” and reengagement “with the European Union” aren’t American values and are barely American interests.  Indeed, they really aren’t proper U.S. concerns.  How would Americans feel if Ukrainian politicians showed up at an “Occupy Wall Street” rally in Washington vowing to stand with protestors in demanding economic redistribution, a North American Union, and a turn away from Europe—all in the name of Ukrainian “interests and values”?

It’s obviously difficult for Washington to imagine any issue that doesn’t warrant U.S. meddling, but Ukraine’s status is one.  Alexander J. Motyl of Rutgers University (Newark) spoke of Washington and Brussels having “vital interests at stake in Ukraine.”  Only in Kiev’s dreams.

More extreme was former UN Ambassador John Bolton, who contended “that tectonic plates are being realigned in Europe” and that Ukraine is “the great prize.”  Robert Zubrin of Pioneer Energy argued that “the events unfolding in Ukraine right now are of global historic importance.”  Indeed, he added, Moscow’s reach for influence in Kiev is part of a “dark program” which “threatens not only the prospects for freedom in Ukraine and Russia, but the peace of the world.”   To suggest that Ukraine is vital to global peace is beyond exaggeration.

A stable, democratic Ukraine would be good for all concerned—and America’s Ukrainian diaspora deserves credit for its long-standing support for its homeland—but Kiev’s orientation isn’t important to Washington.  Ukraine spent centuries subject to Moscow and the U.S. never noticed. Vladimir Putin wants to reestablish Russian influence, but that doesn’t mean he can put the Soviet Humpty Dumpty back together.  Today’s protests in Kiev demonstrate that Ukraine will never be a quiescent tool of Moscow.

On the security side, Russia’s activities in Ukraine do not threaten the U.S.  The reverse, however, is not true.  Bringing NATO up to Russia’s southern border cannot help but be seen as dangerous by Russia—imagine Americans would view the Warsaw Pact expanding to Mexico. Washington’s policy today looks like the fabled “Brezhnev Doctrine,” what is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable.  America seeks to dominate not only the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Central Asia, but all along Russia’s borders.  Washington wants to hold all of the geopolitical chips.

The better strategy would be for the West to treat Russia with respect, acknowledging that it has legitimate interests in Ukraine, while using the prospect of greater economic opportunity to convince Kiev to look westward.  Yanukovich has been rented, not bought.  Complained the Economist:  “Mr. Yanukovich’s favored option seems to be to preserve the status quo and refrain from joining either camp while continuing to milk both.”  Which sounds like a sound strategy from Ukraine’s standpoint.  The EU, which obviously has the most at stake, could up its offer and reconsider its political demands.  How badly does it want to “win”?

Moreover, Europe should look for compromise opportunities with Moscow.  Kiev has proposed creation of “a tripartite commission to handle complex issues.”  Such an approach has promise.  Former congressional staffer Jim Jatras cited recent talks between the EU and Russia over “aspects of the AA with Ukraine that Moscow considers detrimental to its own economy, specifically a massive flow of EU products into Russia via Ukraine.”  All would benefit with greater links between the EU and the Russian-lead CU, which might reduce Moscow’s pressure on Kiev.

Ukraine matters, to Ukraine.  It also matters to Russia.  But less to Europe and much less to the U.S.  If Kiev wants to look east, so be it.  The West is most likely to win influence if it makes itself more attractive, not if it treats the issue like a new Cold War.  Despite Russia’s money Yanukovich’s reelection prospects are weak and Ukraine is likely to eventually join the West.  If not, however, so be it.  The country never was the EU’s or Washington’s to lose.”